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Plotinus resolved the paradox of the immanent transcendence, characterizing the relation between
the One and the universe, through his theory of the two energeiai. According to this doctrine, all exis-
tents have an internal activity and an external activity: the internal activity comprises the true essence
and substance of each being; the external activity is emitted outwards as its image. The source of the
emission is thus present in the lower layer of being by virtue of its manifold images. The prominence
given to light in elucidating this solution led to a distinction between two types of lights: an original
light, corresponding to the internal energeia of every existent, and a secondary light, which is the out-
ﬂow and image of the ﬁrst light, existing outside of the luminous body.
This paper demonstrates the striking similarity between these two Plotinian lights and the con-
cepts of lux and lumen developed by two thirteenth-century philosophers: Robert Grosseteste and
Albertus Magnus. Moreover, the paper contends that the purpose of these two medieval concepts
of light was identical to what Plotinus had in mind when he ﬁrst made the distinction: to account
for the relation between the one and the many.
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From the second half of the twelfth century through the time of Kepler (1571–1630)
and Descartes (1596–1650), light was referred to by two distinct terms: lux and lumen. This
distinction was used in various contexts, whether scientiﬁc, philosophical or theological.
The most crucial deﬁnition of the two terms as distinct was likely that of the Muslim phi-
losopher and physician Ibn Sina (980–1037). In his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima,1
he wrote:1 Tra
2 Av
of Ibn
Aristo
an Ari
a bent
3 Fo
4 See
5 On
(1997)
everythThere are these three intentions . . . of which one is the quality which sight perceives
in the sun and in ﬁre . . . the second is that which shines back due to these [sun or ﬁre],
that is, the splendour which is seen to fall on bodies and white or black or green is
revealed in them . . . If this takes place in one of the phenomena that have light inher-
ently, it will be called lux and its oﬀshoot will be called lumen.2This deﬁnition became standard terminology in medieval literature, pervading all areas
and disciplines.
This paper is concerned with the philosophical motivation for viewing light as a concept
split in two. It claims that the distinction between two kinds of lights had long preceded
the actual coining of distinct terms for these types. It further demonstrates that the origin
for this need can be found within the metaphysical system developed by Plotinus (204–
270). Plotinus’s assertion of two basic metaphysical poles of existence—unity and multi-
plicity—will be shown to stand at the heart of the matter.
Among other things, the position taken here implies that light was not divided into lux
and lumen in order to draw a line between the physical and geometrical, or between the
sensible and spiritual aspects of light, nor was the division intended to reconcile the Pla-
tonic and Aristotelian explanations of light.3 Indeed, once formulated the distinction was
used for various purposes, among them those mentioned above.4 Nevertheless, I contend
that the origin of this clear cut division can be found exclusively within the philosophy of
Plotinus, as expressed in his Enneads. The Aristotelian inﬂuences leading to this division—
and surely there were such inﬂuences5—are already present in the Enneads, and therefore
may not be attributed to the inﬂuence of the new twelfth-century translations.
In order to establish the claim that the distinction between two types of light originated
in the work of Plotinus, I ﬁrst examine the notion of the Plotinian One and its relation to
multiplicity. Next, I demonstrate the pivotal role of light as the most appropriate analogy
for these relations. The split of light in two is shown to be the outcome of the role of light
as the leading metaphor elucidating the complicated relations of proximity and distance,nslated into Latin in the second half of the twelfth century by Avendauth and Dominicus Gundissalinus.
icenna, Liber de anima III, c.1. Quoted and translated in Gilson (2000), pp. 25–26. For a detailed analysis
-Sina’s deﬁnitions see Hasse (2000), pp. 107–123. Hasse stresses (p. 113) that Ibn-Sina did not accept the
telian doctrine of light. He concludes (p. 115) that ‘There is hardly any Western reader who does not give
stotelian or Grossetestian bent to Avicenna’s concept of acquired light (lumen)’. Hasse himself thinks such
to be a mistake.
r such accounts, see Ronchi (1970), pp. 61–62; Jay (1993), p. 106; Zajonc (1993), p. 98.
Smith (2000), pp. 315–336.
e example of Aristotelian inﬂuence is the use of the Aristotelian term energeia or ‘activity’. See Gerson
, p. 295, and Bradshaw (2004), pp. 91–92. Another Aristotelian principle employed by Plotinus is that
ing complete or perfect tends to reproduce itself. See Bussanich (1996), p. 47.
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a close correspondence between the medieval use of lux and lumen as two distinct terms for
light on the one hand, and the Plotinian notion of ‘light from light’ on the other. The rela-
tion between lux and lumen, like the relation between the generator and its images, are
shown to resemble those existing between a uniﬁed principle and its particular instances
on every level of the Plotinian universe.
Establishing the above correspondence is based on the writings of two thirteenth-cen-
tury scholars: Robert Grosseteste (1168–1253) and Albertus Magnus (1193/1200–1280).
Both devoted extensive discussions to light, and both lived during the decisive period when
Greek writings were rediscovered and translated into Latin, as were the commentaries and
innovations made by Arab scholarship. Hence, the terms as used by these two scholars had
a deﬁnitive impact over the next three hundred years.
The question of the precise textual transmission of the Plotinian ideas in the Middle
Ages is only slightly dealt with here, since the paper proposes a philosophical rather than
historical analysis. For the argument to work, all that needs to be shown is that both
Grosseteste and Albertus had access to some version or adaptation of Plotinian ideas.
The enquiry of exactly when and where these two distinct terms were coined is impor-
tant and deserving of study, yet it is beyond the scope of this paper.6 The proposal of this
paper is to point out the striking similarity between the Plotinian handling of unity and
multiplicity through the division of light on the one hand, and the high medieval tendency
to split light on the other.
2. Plotinus on unity and multiplicity
The problem of creating multiplicity from unity is present throughout the Enneads, and
seems to be of major concern for Plotinus. He asks:6 Ibn
Hayth
substa
7 En
transla
8 Th
intellec
for on
case ‘c
(1993)
inﬂuen
betweeHow from the One, if it is such as we say it is, anything else, whether a multiplicity or
a dyad or a number, came into existence, and why it did not on the contrary remain
by itself, but such a great multiplicity ﬂowed from it as that which is seen to exist in
beings, but which we think is right to refer back to the One.7Plotinus’s answer to this question is formulated primarily in terms of a necessary beget-
ting, overﬂowing, emanation or proceeding.8 But the important point in this process, by
which the One transcends its unity to become particularized, is that it does so without
its unity being lessened, without its transcendence hampered and without being changedSina used two distinct Arab terms for light—nur and daw. Nur was translated as lux; daw as lumen. Ibn Al-
am (965–1040) used only daw, although as Sabra (1989, pp. 21–23), notes, he did distinguish between
ntial and accidental lights.
neads 5.1.6, Vol.5, p. 29. All the references to the Enneads are—unless stated otherwise—to Armstrong’s
tion (Plotinus, 1966–1988).
e accuracy of the metaphor of emanation in describing the peculiar relationship between the One and the
t had been doubted by prominent researchers such as Arthur Armstrong and Lloyd Gerson. Armstrong
e writes that emanation in Plotinus ‘has not got any precise philosophical meaning’ and that Plotinus in this
onceals a confusion of thought under a cloud of metaphors’ (Armstrong, 1937, p. 61). See also Gerson
. However, in this paper I am concerned not with the adequacy of the metaphor, but rather with its
ce upon the understanding of light. Hence, the determination of the exact nature of the correspondence
n the metaphor and what it is supposed to describe does not seem to be vital for this study.
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it as it abides unchanged’.9 The perfect and real is eternal and not liable to change. The
One has to be transcendental because, according to Plato’s doctrine as presented in the
Republic, the measure which produces essence—in other words the One—cannot be itself
an essence.10 That which gives form cannot itself be a form. The formlessness of the One
attests that it is not limited in the way that being or essence is limited.11 If it were limited,
this would not only be a sign of a limited perfection, but would also render it a particular
being among other particular beings.12 Further, the One can have nothing in common with
the things that come after it; the common element would otherwise be anterior to it.13 The
One appears accordingly in Plotinus as a non-being, endowing being to all,14 and as a
formless principle which is the source of forms for the entire universe.15
Yet, this ‘measure’, whose transcendence had to be preserved in order for something to
be deﬁned, must also be present in the deﬁned from within. The One is needed here as the
principle of unity as a condition of an ordered system,16 and in fact, of existence. Unity is
the power endowing existence to all beings, giving them their essential nature, their identity
and recognizability.17 When things stop being one, they disintegrate and cease to exist. This
has to do as well with the Plotinian insistence on the continuity of the universe. Such con-
tinuity cannot exist if there is no absorption of the lower reality into the higher. Accurately
interpreted, the Platonic transcendence fundamentally implies—according to Plotinus—
immanence.18 In sharp contrast to the Platonic and Gnostic outlooks, Plotinus strives to
keep the universe as one. The highest realities are present here and now.19 The One is to
be deﬁned accordingly as at the same time transcendent and omnipresent:9 Enn
10 Bre
11 Bu
12 Ha
13 See
14 Enn
15 Ibi
also 6.
16 Bre
17 Ha
18 Ibi
19 Fo
20 Enn
21 IbiFor there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other before
all things which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which
derive from it, and all the same able to be present in a diﬀerent way to these other
things, being really one, and not a diﬀerent being and then one.20The same problem is repeated in the lower levels of being. How can the separate and
independent nature of intelligible reality be present in the sensible world without corrup-
tion of its unity and identity? And how can the Soul be ‘indivisibly divided’ when it comes
to be in diﬀerent bodies?21 The solution oﬀered by Plotinus is the universal principle of two
energeiai: the one internal to the engendering entity; the other external. According to this
principle:eads, Vol.5, 5.4.2, p. 147.
hier (1962), p. 135. For the One as ‘measure and not measured’ see Enneads 5.5.3 and 5.8.18.
ssanich (1996), p. 44.
ger (1993), p. 53.
Roeser (1945), p. 93.
eads 5.2.1, Vol. 5, p. 59: ‘the one is not being, but the generator of being’. See also 6.7.32, 6.8.16 and 6.2.9.
d., 6.7.17, Vol. 7, p. 141: ‘and the form was in that which was shaped, but the shaper was shapeless’. See
7.28 and 6.7.33.
hier (1962), p. 136. For the One as imparting unity, see also Enneads 5.3.15, 5.5.3 and 5.6.3.
ger (1993), p. 49.
d., p. 59.
r this theme see Hadley (1997).
eads 5.4.1, Vol. 5, p. 141.
d., 4.2.1, Vol. 4, pp. 21–23.
22 Ibi
23 Th
examp
expres
Plotinu
and a
Trinity
order
lumen
(1996b
24 En
25 Ar
also as
26 Bra
27 Ric
28 Fo
ornam
convey
that la
outsid
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own substances. . . a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of
image of the archetypes from which it was produced . . . 22The higher level of being is thus present in the lower, not as itself, but as an image. The
source of these images remains distinct and unchanged. Every entity at each level is
now producing, and its product is an extension of its being, yet not identical with it:23In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance and one which
goes out from substance; and that which belongs to substance is the active actuality
which is each particular thing, and the other activity derives from that ﬁrst one, and
must in everything be a consequence of it, diﬀerent from the thing itself. 24Both the source and the image are denominated as activities or energeiai, 25 yet the source
is called ‘active actuality’ and identiﬁed with substance. The ﬁrst is the cause, while the
second is an eﬀect. They are ordered, with the substance coming ﬁrst and its outcome sec-
ond and there is a delicate play of identity and diﬀerence between them. David Bradshaw
writes that the doctrine of two energeiai is used by Plotinus to achieve exactly this: a bal-
anced emphasis on likeness, distinctness and an ongoing dependence.26
The notion of image enables Plotinus to speak of the One, the Intellect or the Soul as
being at the same time transcendent and omnipresent. They are omnipresent through their
generated images, while as sources, as the thing in itself, they remain aloof. The relation of
‘being an image of’ is a relation of resemblance. This notion was analyzed by Paul Ricoeur
as a concept that ‘opposes and unites identity and diﬀerence’.27 Ricoeur believes that the
use of metaphor is the best way to demonstrate and, in fact, create the relation of resem-
blance. The use of metaphor in solving the problem of the immanent transcendence is there-
fore not a mere illustration. It is, indeed, the instrument that provides the most direct access
to resemblance itself. It is not a description of this notion, but rather its presentation.
Given his mistrust in discursive thinking,28 Plotinus recruited several metaphors in
order to explain the notion of a unity that manifests its presence within multiplicityd., 5.1.6, Vol. 5, p. 31.
e relation between a hypostasis and its product is often expressed in Plotinus by the term logos (for
le, see 5.1.6). One meaning of logos in Plotinus is the formative force proceeding from a higher principle,
sing that principle in a lower plane of being. Thus, the second, external energeia can be identiﬁed with
s’s notion of logos (Armstrong, 1967, p. 105). Just the same, Plotinus often suggests that light is a logos
form-giving principle (see n. 56). In the writings of Augustine (354–430) logos becomes the aspect of the
involved with the incarnation of Jesus, and in the thirteenth century we ﬁnd that lux and lumen are used in
to illustrate the relations between the members of the Trinity, with lux playing the role of the Father, and
the role of the Son. One such example is found in Grosseteste’s Hexae¨meron, pa. 8, ch. 3.1; Grosseteste
), p. 224.
neads 5.4.2, Vol. 5, p. 147.
istotle thought of energeia as actuality or an exercise of a capacity. Plotinus envisioned the internal energeia
intrinsically productive. For the meaning of this term in both Aristotle and Plotinus, see Bradshaw (2004).
dshaw (2004), p. 80.
oeur (1977), p. 196.
r this theme see Bussinach (1996), p. 39, and Brehier (1962), p. 30: ‘the image in Plotinus is not an external
ent but an integral element. . . he aspires. . . to give utterance to realities which language is powerless to
. The alternative left is to suggest them through analogy’. See also Rappe (1995), p. 156: ‘Plotinus thinks
nguage fails as a vehicle for conveying metaphysical truth since words necessarily refer to entities standing
e of the linguistic system, whereas truth is both self-certifying and self-revealing’.
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task?
3. Light is the answer
Before approaching these metaphors, I ﬁrst examine the structure of the relation that
these ﬁgures of speech are intended to explicate. John Fielder suggests four such charac-
teristics for the relation between an archetype and its images: diﬀerence; similarity, that is,
resemblance; inferiority and dependence of the image on the archetype.29 Based on this list
and on Frederic Schroeder’s suggestions,30 I propose the following traits: (1) the source
must logically and ontologically precede its oﬀspring; (2) the existence of progeny must
be totally dependent on the source, and when the source ceases to exist, the oﬀspring must
immediately disappear as well; (3) the oﬀspring must maintain an immediate, dynamic and
continuous relationship with its source in order to preserve its existence; (4) the copy must
resemble the source in some way; (5) and yet it has to be diﬀerent from it; if it would
spread itself, the source would be diminished; (6) the source must be wholly present in
a plurality of diﬀerent oﬀsprings in diﬀerent spatial locations without being divided among
them.
Plotinus uses a number of explicative metaphors for the paradox: ﬁre producing heat
and snow generating cold; perfumed objects spreading their smell;31 a plant growing from
a seed or from a root; a spring and the rivers that rise from it;32 a model and its portrait; a
mirror image33 and light emanating from the sun or any other luminous body.34 As Fielder
notes, each of these metaphors suggests a diﬀerent sense of generation. The mature plant
comes into being only through the destruction of the seed, whereas the sun continues to
exist despite its production of light. Perfumes are weakened or diluted by the air as they
are diﬀused, but a mature plant and the mirror image are not similarly diminished cop-
ies.35 The relation between a portrait and a person portrayed is disqualiﬁed as an appro-
priate metaphor based upon conditions (2), (3) and (6) above: the portrait remains viable
even in the absence of the origin, and nothing of the portrayed person remains within its
image. Similarly, the ﬁre and its heat are not suitable as illustrations for the One and its
images based upon conditions (3) and (4): some warmth remains when ﬁre is put out. Fur-
thermore, warmth cannot be called the image of ﬁre, since it does not resemble it.36 Hence,
I agree with Fielder, Schroeder and Werner Beierwaltes37 who claimed that light is the
most adequate of all metaphors used by Plotinus to clarify the relation between a source
and its copy, and for any kind of generation of one level of being from another. It is the
most suitable paradigm for several reasons, but most of all since it is the only sensible anal-
ogy that has something in common with what it accounts for: incorporeality. The incor-
poreality of the One is a prominent element in Plotinus’s explanation of its ability to be29 See Fielder (1976), pp. 103–104; Schroeder (1996), p. 338.
30 Schroeder (1992), p. 24.
31 Enneads 5.1.6, Vol. 5, p. 31 and 5.4.1, Vol. 5, p. 143.
32 Ibid., 3.8.10, Vol. 3, p. 395.
33 Ibid., 6.4.10, Vol. 6, p. 305.
34 Ibid., 5.3.12, Vol. 5, p. 117.
35 Fielder (1976), pp. 106–107.
36 Enneads 6.4.10, Vol. 6, p. 305.
37 See Fielder (1976), pp. 107–108; Schroeder (1992), pp. 32–35; Beierwaltes (1961).
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requirement (6). When Plotinus inquires ‘how it is the same which is over all’,38 he imme-
diately presents a lengthy demonstration of the incorporeality of the source of light, which
although present within a luminous body, is not in fact a part of its mass. It is, rather, a
power, residing within that body:38 En
39 Ibi
40 Ibi
41 En
42 En
43 See
accord
meanin
44 No
rather
hold eFor it is not in that it is body that it has the light, but in that it is luminous body, by
another power which is not bodily.39Once deﬁned as a power that cannot be located spatially, light can be said to reside in
many locations without being divided: ‘that which belongs to no body. . . cannot be di-
vided into parts’ for ‘how would you divide that which has no magnitude?’40 Thus light
is ‘equally diﬀused within and throughout the entire sphere. . . simultaneously present at
each and every point in the sphere’.41
Plotinus stresses another feature which renders light the most suitable metaphor to
explicate the connection between the One and being: its necessary dependence on its
source:Just as the image of something, like the weaker light, if cut oﬀ from that from which
it is, would no longer exist, and in general one cannot cut oﬀ and make exist [sepa-
rately] anything at all which derives its existence from something else and is its
image.42Hence, light remains as the only suitable metaphor for the analyzed relations. This comes
as no surprise to either Schroeder or Beierwaltes, for according to them the image of light
in Plotinus is much more than an illustration. It becomes a mode that actually casts and
directs the terms of analysis. They believe that light in Plotinus is not another metaphor:
the One is light proprio sensu, and the procession from it is the procession of light from a
source.43 Even if we choose not to follow this line of thought to its limits,44 we are still
compelled to acknowledge the centrality and uniqueness of the function of light in expli-
cating the relation between the One and what proceeds from it.
4. One light is not enough
In this section I put forward the following argument: Plotinus’s solution to the paradox
of the immanent transcendence, in terms of two energeiai combined with light as a leading
metaphor, entails a split of light in two, each light corresponding to a diﬀerent energeia or
activity.neads 6.4.7, Vol. 6, p. 293.
d., p. 295.
d., 6.4.8, p. 299.
neads 6.4.7; Plotinus (1991), p. 446. Due to its clarity, I favored MacKenna’s translation here.
neads 6.4.9, Vol. 6, p. 303.
Beierwaltes (1961); Schroeder (1996), pp. 341–344. Rein Ferwerda (1965) represents the alternative view,
ing to which symbols in the Enneads only redescribe the doctrinal content, and do not contribute to
g. That is, light in his view does not designate the true nature of the three hypostases.
t withstanding my conviction that the selection and use of analogies in Plotinus is not ornamental, but
inherent to his philosophical outlook, my argument does not depend on accepting this position and can
ven if light is viewed as an illustrative metaphor and nothing else.
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of generation and image between the diﬀerent levels of being:45 Enn
46 Ibi
47 Ibi
48 Ibi
49 Ibi
50 EnnBut the activity within the luminous body, which is like its life, is greater and is a
kind of source and origin of its [outward] activity; that which is outside the limits
of the body, an image of that within, is a second activity which is not separated from
the ﬁrst.45This quotation clearly shows how light is considered a particular instance for the general
principle of an active, internal actuality generating an outward actuality—the external
actuality being diﬀerent from the ﬁrst and weaker, yet similar and connected: it is its im-
age. Plotinus writes of two lights again in 2.1.7:But by ﬁre he [Plato] does not mean either of the other kinds of ﬁre but the light
which he says is other than ﬂame, and only gently warm. This light is a body, but
another light shines from it which has the same name, which we teach is incorporeal.
This is given from the ﬁrst light, shining out from it as its ﬂower and splendour; that
ﬁrst light is the truly bright and clear body.46Here the diﬀerence between the two lights seems to be the diﬀerence between the corporeal
and spiritual lights. However, as indicated above, this is not the case. According to Ploti-
nus, the light inside the luminous source resides in a body, but is not itself material: ‘but
one must consider light as altogether incorporeal, even if it belongs to a body’.47 It seems
to me that the diﬀerence here is that between light as substance and light as a quality or an
accident. The substantial light is the ‘true’ light, while the accidental quality is its image.
The image depends upon the source in the same way as a quality depends on a substance.
When the substance ceases to exist, its qualities disappear with it. Plotinus speciﬁcally says
that:The light in bodies of this kind, bodies, that is, which are primarily and originally of
this kind, is altogether substance, corresponding to the form of the primarily lumi-
nous body.48From the split of light into substantial and accidental, it follows necessarily that of the
two lights, only the second—that is, the splendor—is accessible to the sense of sight. Ploti-
nus held to the principle according to ‘that which is known by our sense-perception is an
image of the thing, and sense-perception does not apprehend the thing itself; for that
remains outside’.49 However, as far as sunlight is concerned, Plotinus seems to think that
we can sometimes see it directly, before it has illuminated the intermediate air:For when the light of the sun approaches. . . we often perceive it when it is elsewhere,
before it comes near our eyes. . . and when the light with which our sight must con-
nect has not arrived.50eads 4.5.7, Vol. 4, pp. 305–307.
d., 2.1.7., Vol.2, pp. 29–31.
d.
d., 4.5.7, Vol. 4, p. 309.
d., 5.5.1, Vol. 5, p. 157 and 2.6.1. See also Emilsson (1988), p. 52.
eads 4.5.4, Vol. 4, p. 297.
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the second, not the ﬁrst light. In discussing the relation between the One and the intellect,
Plotinus again refers to the two lights. The intellect in relation to the One51 Ibi
52 Gu
53 En
54 Co
55 Ibi
56 Fo
explici
darkne
and inIs like a light dispersed far and wide from some one thing translucent in itself; what is
dispersed is image, but that from which it comes is truth; though certainly the dis-
persed image, Intellect, is not of alien form.51This is a straightforward indication for the claim that the split of light accounts for the
relations between unity and plurality. The Intellect is the ﬁrst dyad according to Plotinus,
for it involves the duality of a thought and its object. Here it is compared with the second
light, the dispersed one. The scattered light is thus born in plurality. The point stressed in
this last citation, is that although the second light is an image of the ﬁrst, it nevertheless
shares similarity of genre with it: they are of the same kind. The distinction between light
and its source can thus account both for the continuity of the various levels—as the two
lights are of the same kind and continuously connected—and for their otherness. Other-
ness in Plotinus consists in the notion of image as less than and dependent upon its prior.52
And this is the essence of their diﬀerence. Plotinus further states that the Intellect is sep-
arated from the One ‘only by otherness’.53
In his paper on light in Plotinus and Aquinas, Kevin Corrigan attempts to deﬁne these
two lights discussed by Plotinus. In Corrigan’s view, the light inside a luminous body is an
incorporeal energeia, a dynamic, substantial activity, while the light in the diaphanous is a
quality of a substrate, an accident to the substance of the object. This external activity is
the visible, perceptible light.54 Accordingly, he set the ﬁrst, ‘internal’ light as the substan-
tial meaning of light, which is intelligible. The internal, intelligible light becomes thus a
source both of being and of understanding of the external light, that is, of the ‘physical’,
corporeal light.55 I ﬁnd this interpretation diﬃcult to accept, despite its appealing nature
as far as the treatment of metaphor is concerned. My diﬃculty lies in the fact that in Ploti-
nus both lights are incorporeal, and the second light is speciﬁcally deﬁned as a form, and,
as has just been indicated, equated with the Intellect.56 Moreover, light in Plotinus is used
to deﬁne the exact nature of the immaterial, and only through its attributes can he begin to
formulate a positive account of relation between the forms and their sensible participants.
In my view, the diﬀerence between the two kinds of light is not the diﬀerence between the
spiritual and the corporeal, but rather between the principles of unity and of multiplicity.
The second light in Plotinus is the Intellect with its manifold forms, not the material world.
The two lights are referred to again when the relation of the universal Soul to the partic-
ular souls is explained, and here too, only incorporeal entities are at stake. It is true that at
a certain level the tension between unity and multiplicity becomes the tension between the
one intelligible form and the many material entities deﬁned by it. Yet, if we concentrate ond., 6.8.18, Vol. 7, p. 289.
rtler (1992), p. 456.
neads 5.6.1, Vol. 5, p. 33. See also Rist (1967), pp. 29–30.
rrigan (1993), p. 192.
d., p. 193.
r example, in Enneads 1.6.3, the light present in the lower level, that of corporeal particular entities, is
tly said to be unembodied: ‘The simple beauty of color comes about by shape and the mastery of the
ss in matter by the presence of light which is incorporeal and formative power and form’ (Vol. 1, p. 241);
2.4.5, Plotinus writes: ‘the light [in each thing] is the rational forming principle’ (Vol. 4, p. 115).
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of existence, that of the relation between the one and the many, a problem of concern for
Plotinus throughout.
It is possible, however, to view the split as that between the immanent forms, which
Plotinus associates with accidents, and the transcendent forms, which he associates with
substance.57 The transcendent forms are the ﬁrst kind of light, while the immanent ones
are the second.
Plotinus refers, therefore, to two lights: a ﬁrst and a second. The ﬁrst light is internal to
a luminous body; it is an inner activity, which is also the true thing or the ‘thing itself’, or
maybe even the (spiritual) substance of such a body; it is unmoved and unchanged, yet it is
productive. Ontologically, it precedes the second and it is the source and origin of this
other light, which is its image. The second light is placed outside; it is diﬀused afar and
travels in space. This last attribute enables it to reach our eyes and be seen, a quality lack-
ing in the ﬁrst light. In the following I show that the notions of lux and lumen in the writ-
ings of Grosseteste and Albertus are used and deﬁned by these very same qualiﬁcations.
Yet before that a comment is in place concerning the way Grosseteste and Albertus
became familiar with the Plotinian ideas.
5. The two lights transmitted
I draw attention to two routes through which Grosseteste and Albertus could have
learnt the Plotinian idea of two lights. Indeed, it seems likely that these two routes had
a parallel impact upon the two writers.58 One path of inﬂuence runs through Ibn Sina,
whose famous deﬁnitions for lux and lumen have been quoted above. He had at his dis-
posal the Arabic Plotinian texts: the so called Theology of Aristotle, the Letter on divine
science and the fragments attributed to the Greek sage (Dicta sapientis Graecis). These
were not straight forward translations of the Enneads, but rather a translation-cum-para-
phrase, belonging to the body of translations and adaptations made by al-Kindi’s (d. 866)
circle in ninth century Baghdad.59 Al-Kindi’s translations were, in turn, extracts from an
earlier Arabic paraphrase (now lost) of Plotinus, which itself ‘derives ultimately from the
Greek of Plotinus’ Enneads IV–VI much as we have it today’.60 Both the theory of the two
energeiai61 and the notion of two lights are clearly present in these texts. One example is
quoted here, yet more can be found:57 See
58 Th
necessa
(1080–
59 Ad
60 Zim
61 Epi
62 DicThe action of the sun—that is, light—is life of the pure, transparent body, and is the
source and beginning of light. The light on the outer surface of the pure body is but a
reﬂection of the inner light.62Gurtler (1992), p. 456.
ere are a few other possible paths. For example, Hasse (2000), p. 115, mentions the theory of the tria
ria, transmitted through Calcidius (ca. fourth century), Macrobius (ca. 430) and William of Conches
1154), as a possible source of the dual terminology for light. Another source could be al-Kindi.
amson (2000), p. 8.
mermann (1986), p. 113.
stola de scientia divina 173–175. see Plotinus. (1959), p. 337.
ta sapientis graeci VI 2–3 and I 17–19. See Plotinus. (1959), p. 165 and 367 respectively.
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which were translated from the Greek in the ninth century by John Scotus Eurigena (810–
877), and again in the thirteenth century by Grosseteste. In On the divine names Dionysius
refers explicitly to the two lights:63 On
64 See
65 On
66 Mc
67 On
68 Ibi
69 DeFrom the Good comes the light which is an image of Goodness; wherefore the Good
is described by the name of ‘Light’, being the archetype thereof which is revealed in
that image.63This notion is wrapped in a language of emanation, presenting the Good as pouring itself
forth while remaining undiminished, unmingled, uniﬁed and complete in its distinction.64
Interesting to note is that both Eurigena and Grosseteste translated this passage using
lumen for the light which is from the Good, and lux for the light as a name of the Good
(note the capital ‘L’). Dionysius was also a major channel through which the doctrine of
two energeai had come to the medieval Latins. This principle, found in the forth chapter of
On the divine names, was expressed by Dionysius as bonum est diﬀusivum sui, and was ta-
ken up from there by various thinkers, such as Bonaventure (1221–1274) and Thomas
Aquinas (1225/7–1274) to be used in accounts of creation.
6. Two medieval lights
Notwithstanding the substantial diﬀerences between their uses of the term lux, both
Grosseteste and Albertus deﬁne lux as the ﬁrst form and as the form of the luminaries.
In Grosseteste, lux is the ﬁrst corporeal form: ‘the ﬁrst corporeal form which some call cor-
poreity is in my opinion lux’; ‘thus lux, which is the ﬁrst form created in ﬁrst matter’.65 As
such it is present everywhere in the material world as a principle of extension and energy.66
Grosseteste stresses that the ﬁrmament—the ﬁrst created body—is made from lux: both the
matter and form of the ﬁrmament is the lux prima, and the sun and the other luminaries
were made from the ﬁrmament, that is, from the primordial lux.67 In Grosseteste’s view,
the bodies of the luminaries and their lux are of ‘one and the same nature and one and
the same creation’.68 Hence, lux is not only the form of the luminaries, it is also their matter.
This position is consistent with Grosseteste’s insistence on the materiality of light.
In the writings of Albertus, lux is deﬁned as the form of a luminous body:The luminary is a body, which holds in itself lux as a form. . . lux is called the form of
lumen in luminaries or in where there is a ﬁrst source of lumen69However, it is not deﬁned as its substantial form. A substantial form cannot be active,
whereas according to Albertus lux is active, moving towards all forms and instilling them
with power. Due to this delivering function, lux can no longer be considered a substantial
form, nor an accidental form:the divine names, 4.4; Dionysius the Areopagite (1951), p. 91.
, for example, ibid., 2.11, pp. 78–81.
light; Grosseteste (1996a), p. 765.
Evoy (1982), p. 283.
the six days of creation, pa. 5, ch. 4.1; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 161.
d., ch. 5.1, p. 162.
anima, lib. 2, tr. 3, cap. 8; Albertus Magnus (1968), p. 110: 63–69.
70 Sup
71 On
72 De
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74 De
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anothe
78 Th
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stantial or accidental, is not one with them: that which is moving is not the
movement.70The description of lux as in motion marks a diﬀerence from the ﬁrst Plotinian light, which
was characterized as unchanging and unmoved. Yet the complete otherness of lux is pre-
served. Thus, lux is a special form, which cannot be treated according to the categories of
the ‘regular’ forms. For both authors then, lux enjoys an ontological priority: it is the ﬁrst
created form and identiﬁed as the form of a source of light. These characteristics render it
similar to Plotinus’s ﬁrst light.
In relation to lumen, lux is explicitly said to be its ontological precedent, as it is its
source and origin. Lux is deﬁned by both Grosseteste and Albertus as begetting or trans-
mitting by essence. Grosseteste writes that ‘every lux has by nature and essence its splen-
dor that it begets’;71 and Albertus states thatIt is not the ﬁrst agent, unless by that which transmits by essence, as lux shines by its
essence: and which transmits by essence any action, and does so always and
incessantly.72Lumen, in turn, is presented as the outcome of this necessary begetting. It is thus the
oﬀspring, copy or image of lux. Grosseteste states that ‘one point of lux can ﬁll a whole
hemisphere with lumen’,73 and in another place he refers to the sun, which hides the stars
and the moon because ‘it does not allow at the same time with her the species of another’s
lux’.74 I do not wish to consider the complicated issue of the exact denotation of the term
species in medieval use. Suﬃce it to say that the term species refers to a likeness emanating
from an object, which is a sign and representation of the known thing.75
Lux is deﬁned in another way by Albertus as the form of lumen in a body that pours the
lux,76 that is, the origin of which lumen is the copy. As for the other light, Albertus states
that ‘lumen is now the received form from that which shines at ﬁrst’,77 and that which
shines at ﬁrst is, of course, lux. Lumen is then the form lux takes when it is received within
the various bodies, including the transparent medium. Hence, in Albertus we ﬁnd the same
denotation of lumen as the species or intentio of lux.78
Another common feature of lux mentioned by both authors is that it is locked inside
bodies. In Grosseteste lux is always attached to matter as the form of corporeity. Forer Dionysium De divinis nominibus, cap. 2; Albertus Magnus (1972), p. 62: 38–41.
the six days of creation, pa. 8, ch. 3.1; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 224.
intellectu, lib. 2, tr. 1, cap. 3; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 507. Recall Plotinus assertion that ‘all
when they came to perfection produce; the One is always perfect and therefore produces everlastingly’
ds 5.1.6, Vol. 5, p. 33).
the six days of creation, pa. 2, ch. 10.1; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 97.
operatione solis 26; Grosseteste (1974a), p. 85.
m the perspective of this paper it is important to note that according to Roger Bacon’s list, synonyms for
are, among others: ‘image’, ‘similitude’ and ‘intentio’. See Bacon (1983), p. 6. For more on this term see
(1994).
intellectu, tr. 3, cap. 1; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 498.
d.; Bonin (2001), p. 31, also suggests that lux be considered a source in Albertus, while lumen as its eﬀect in
r.
e claim that lumen is the species of lux had been made in contemporary literature regarding other medieval
s. See Smith (2000), pp. 325–326; and Lindberg (1986), p. 20.
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colored body: ‘for color is lux embodied in a wet transparent medium’.79 It is locked inside
such a body and cannot express itself without the assistance of the lumen in the diapha-
nous.80 In Albertus lux never moves in space, and is always placed within its proper mat-
ter—the thickened transparency.79 On
p. 167
80 De
81 Alb
82 I n
their in
83 On
84 De
85 Alb
86 On
87 IbiAnd the purer it is, the more remote it is from transparency, that is, as it more resem-
bles a thing of higher nature; and the proper actuality of this is the lux which comes
into being in that nature, for it comes into being as often as its parts become clearer
and nobler, and therefore all such things shine.81According to Albertus, once a transparency becomes clear and pure enough, it loses its
transparent nature and becomes thickened. Things that shine are not transparent, because
a transparent object can only receive light, not produce it. Therefore, only a thickened
transparency can produce light, and lux can inhere only in such matter, whether in heaven
or within our eyes.
The notion of lux as locked inside bodies conforms to another trait of the Plotinian ﬁrst
light: its being internal to a self luminous body. In contrast, for both authors, lumen is
always out there in the transparent medium, just like the Plotinian second light, which
is ‘diﬀused afar’.82 Thus, for Grosseteste, while lux is the cause of color from within the
colored body, lumen is such a cause when it is mixed with a transparent medium (diapha-
nous).83 Albertus believes that ‘lumen is an intentio having spiritual being in the transpar-
ent medium’,84 and he repeats his assertion in De meteoris:Lumen is an intentio of the form of a luminous body, which, having spiritual being, is
generated in the transparent medium.85The notion of lux as a substance and lumen as its accidental quality is present only in
Grosseteste. In his discussion of the question of the substantiality of light, Grosseteste cites
John Damascene (676–754/787), who claimed that lumen is a quality of ﬁre, and that since
it is always generated by ﬁre it does not have its own ‘‘hypostasis’’, that is, existence in its
own right.86 Grosseteste then argues that lux has two senses: (1) a very subtle bodily sub-
stance which is by nature self-generative; and (2) an accidental quality that proceeds from
the natural generative action of the substance of lux.87 Grosseteste does not state this
explicitly, but it seems that to him lux is the active substance, and lumen (according to
Damascene’s own words) is the accidental quality that proceeds from it. In Albertus’s
view, as already noted, lux is neither substantial nor accidental. Lumen, however, cannot
only be considered an accident, but anthe six days of creation, pa. 2, ch. 10.2; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 99. I favored Gilson’s translation here (2000,
) over Martin’s (‘embodied in a clear liquid’).
operatione solis 6; Grosseteste (1974a), pp. 69–70.
ertus, On sense and sensibles, ch. 12. See Akdogan (1978), p. 173.
ote one exception: Albertus thought that in regard to transparent bodies, such as stars, lumen can enter
terior and be gathered within them. See Grant (1994), p. 397.
the rainbow; Grosseteste (1974b), p. 391.
anima, lib. 2, tr. 3, cap. 12; Albertus Magnus (1968), p. 116: 73–74.
ertus, De meteoris, lib. 2, tr. 2, cap. 6. Quoted and trans. in Gilson (2000), p. 64.
the six days of creation, pa. 2, ch. 10.2; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 98.
d.
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accident of ﬁre and an accidental accident of the heated body.88The two writers also make the same distinction as made by Plotinus between the two
lights in regard to their visibility. According to Plotinus, as well as according to Grosse-
teste and Albertus, only the second light is accessible to our sense of sight. In the latter’s
writings lumen is often treated as color, and ‘color is with the number of those who are
visible according to themselves’.89 As mentioned above, Grosseteste believes that since
lux is always inside bodies, it cannot reach our eyes. The agent traveling in space
approaching our senses is lumen. Color according to Albertus ‘has the essence and form
of color from lumen’.90 Yet Albertus goes even further, stating that:Lumen is the common nature, that makes the visible visible, and color is seen only
because it participates within the ﬂow of lumen.91Moreover, Grosseteste sees lumen not only as color, but as daylight as well, for lux, when it
is in the sublunary world, incorporated within the elements, looses its power to aﬀect its
surrounding and thus cause visibility. But lumen, when it is in the air, has the greatest pow-
ers: the air is ‘being lit up only as long as lumen is present, and when lumen is gone—it goes
back to darkness’.92 Lumen, then, is seen as brightness, shining, or daylight. It often ap-
pears accompanied by the noun fulgor, that is, ‘shining’ or ‘brightness’. One such an exam-
ple appears when Grosseteste explains that the stars are beautiful ‘simply because they
shine with lumen’ (luminis fulgore).93 In another place Grosseteste explicitly identiﬁes lu-
men with the power of being seen: ‘the sun is in the view of the seeing eye through the
strength of its lumen’.94
And what about lux? Is it also visible? Clearly not, according to Grosseteste, at least not
without the help of its messenger lumen, and only through it.95 In Albertus the lux of the
sun is endowed with visibility, in a way similar to Plotinus.96 However, its visibility is
unique: it is not seen in the same way as other things are seen. Albertus crowns lux as
‘the perfect visible’,97 meaning that it is seen directly and not through its encounter with
matter or through an intermediate.
As claimed above, the Plotinian invention of the two lights results from the principal
function given to light in explicating the relations between unity and multiplicity. Next,
I seek to show that lux and lumen are used by Grosseteste and Albertus exactly for theer Dionysium De divinis nominibus, cap. 2. 32; Albertus Magnus (1972), p. 64: 17–26.
anima, lib. 2, tr. 3, cap. 7; Albertus Magnus (1968), p. 108: 22–23.
intellectu, tr. 3, cap.1; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 488.
d., p. 109: 13–14.
the six days of creation, pa. 8, ch. 27.11; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 343.
d., pa. 2, ch. 10.4, p. 99.
operatione solis 7; Grosseteste (1974a), p. 71.
e situation is diﬀerent when it comes to the beatiﬁc vision. In this kind of vision, according to both authors,
get to see lux directly. However, this issue will not be developed here due to its extensiveness.
writes: ‘our sun, that is, which is seen to us with perceiving through its own being, which is the bright,
ates as if sharing its intentio, which is lux’. Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, cap. 4. 9; Albertus
s (1972), p. 119: 18–22. Note that lux here is only ‘as if’ an intentio, and the sun is thus perceived directly,
h its own being.
e see everything [visible] to be made from that which is by itself and the perfect visible’. De intellectu, lib. 1,
ap. 5; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 480.
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multiple fragments or splinters. The fact that both are one and the same entity, namely
light, demonstrates the feature of immanence in transcendence so vital to the Plotinian
outlook.
As the form of corporeity, lux, according to Grosseteste, is present throughout the
material universe and is an inherent part of it. Through its powers of self-generation, it
endows matter with the most basic bodily feature: extension. The idea of common corpo-
reity links directly to Ibn Gabirol’s (1020/1–1070) notion of common corporeity, which
was conceived as the form that all things have in common, the simple that imparts unity
to all.98 Grosseteste had used an existing notion, but its identiﬁcation with lux is new and
original.99 It is lux then that, according to Grosseteste, assures the unity of the material
universe. The concept of lux deﬁned as the common corporeity abolishes the diﬀerence
in principle whereby the superlunary universe was thought to be of an essentially diﬀerent
make up than the earth (aether), establishing one physical system out of what for Aristotle
had been two separated ones. This uniﬁed physical system is based on lux. Grosseteste
replaced the diﬀerences in kind with a distinction in degree of density, perfection and
beauty: the lux of the upper world is more rare, noble and perfect that the lux in the sub-
lunary world, yet they are principally the same.100
The unitary role of lux does not end here. In De motu corporali et luce, Grosseteste dis-
tinguishes (following Aristotle) between two kinds of motion: local motion (motus localis),
which takes place through time, and alteration (alteratio, mutatio), which is immediate. He
then poses lux as responsible for both. When it drags matter with it while generating, it
produces local motion. Alteration occurs when lux is cast from within a body out to
the diaphanous without being accompanied by matter. It then passes through the diapha-
nous at once.101 Lux, then, is the generator of motion.
Through its necessary self multiplication, lux also serves as the principle of connection.
Grosseteste adopts the essentials of al-Kindi’s claim that everything acts on everything else
through the radiation of force or lux.102 According to al-Kindi, Lux is the power residing
inside natural bodies, and is the source of their multiplication, that is, the source of their
ability to aﬀect their surrounding. No causality is possible without lux and therefore no
regularity as well. Grosseteste thus deems lux as the principle of unity in the world, not
merely because it is everywhere, but because it enables the diﬀerent, separate, particular
objects to be connected, and to be connected in an ordered, regular manner.
Another example of the unitary function of lux can be found in Albertus’s theory of the
agent intellect. The relation between the corporeal lux and the intentiones of the colors is
compared time and again by Albertus with the relation between the universals within the
agent intellect and the universals in each particular soul. That comparison is meant to
exemplify the way in which the universals are not individuated when grasped by particular
intellects. The agent intellect thus is said to be like lux, which, even though it is in many
colored bodies, still has a power that remains universal.103 The lux of the sun is something98 Simson (1962), p. 54.
99 McEvoy (1982), p. 161.
100 Ibid., p. 185.
101 De motu corporali et luce; Grosseteste (1912), p. 92.
102 Lindberg (1986), pp. 16–17.
103 De intellectu, lib. 1, tr. I, cap. 7; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 488.
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individuated. In exactly the same manner the agent intellect, which constitutes the domain
of intelligible forms, is not individuated.104 In Albertus, the agent intellect as lux stands
out against the plurality of the speciﬁc, determinate forms. Albertus states that the agent
intellect is similar to lux because both are ‘ﬁrst beings’. He poses the principle that104 Th
follow
Christi
intellec
105 De
106 Ibi
107 Alb
108 De
109 IbiIn the whole world in which some deliver and some are delivered, there is necessarily
one ﬁrst being, which is so great an agent.105The ﬁrst agent of the whole physical universe is the lux of the sun. Albertus then presents
another principle: the human soul is an echo or image of the form of the world. It is similar
to the whole universe because its multitude of intellectual beings requires a ﬁrst agent. This
ﬁrst agent resembles lux, because like lux it is universal, and like lux it ﬂows and delivers the
forms.106 However, these forms themselves are not lux; they are lumen: ‘form, since it makes
a thing knowable, is a sort of lumen’;107 and ‘these lumina are the forms of the world’.108
Lux, then, is the ﬁrst universal form and the source of all the forms in the universe, and
the lumina are the speciﬁc forms issued from it: ‘lumen always extends itself towards the
more determinate things, it is inserted into them, thus giving them being’.109 The diﬀerent,
speciﬁc colors, as well as the diﬀerent, speciﬁc forms, are all lumen. Lux is thus present
throughout the material and intelligible worlds through its image and messenger—lumen.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, I proposed that the central paradox of the Plotinian metaphysics—that of
unity in multiplicity, in which a unity is present within and throughout the plurality of
beings while remaining at the same time an undivided, separate whole—can be resolved
by the doctrine of two energeiai. According to this doctrine, for each and every entity
in the universe, and at every level of being, a diﬀerentiation can be made between, on
the one hand, the thing in itself, that is, its inner true substance and selfhood, and, on
the other hand, an outer spread of representations or images. Further, I pointed out
how the relations between these inner and outer activities are elucidated through the rela-
tions between a source of light and its external manifestation in the visible splendour.
Plotinus weaves a fabric of identity and diﬀerence, continuity and dependence between
the two lights. The ability to insist on the source’s presence through its images depends on
this delicate interplay. The central function of light in accounting for this paradox led
Plotinus to speak of it as twofold. The general principle of two energeiai, which when
applied to snow produces the couple ‘snow–cold’, and when applied to perfume produces
the pair ‘perfume–smell’, also produces the pair ‘light–light’ when applied to light. This
double naming underlies similarity between the members of the pair. They are of the samee question of the unity of the agent intellect had been the center of a hot debate in the discussed period,
ing the claim of Averroes (1126–1198) that it is one and the same for all people. Albertus, as many other
an thinkers, abhorred that assertion and took pains to show, that along with its universality, the agent
t was also individuated. He wrote the De unitate intellectu especially for that purpose.
intellectu, lib. 2, tr. 1, cap. 3; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 506.
d., p. 507.
ertus, De causis et processu universitatis 2. 1. 1 [61:25]. Quoted in Latin by Bonin (2001), p. 105 n. 34.
intellectu, lib. 2, tr. 1, cap. 11; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 519.
d.
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similarity minor. Such pairs cannot be considered one.
Again I stress that these two lights are not the intelligible and corporeal lights, and
therefore do not stand for the disparity between the intelligible and the corporeal worlds.
Rather, they represent the singular and universal versus the plural and particular. The
relations between them are depicted by Plotinus through the characteristics of a source
and its copy, an ontological precedent and its antecedent which is similar and dependent
on it, a cause and its eﬀect, something that is visible and its invisible principle.
All these features can be discerned to exist within the medieval division of light into
lux and lumen. The medieval emphasis upon the distinct existence of these two lights,
as manifested in giving them two names, can be considered both as a continuation
and an expansion of the Plotinian tradition. The medieval thinkers were not satisﬁed
with applying this distinction to optical descriptions only, and elaborated it far beyond
the original use, extending it to new domains. This evolution is exempliﬁed in Albertus’s
account of the agent intellect as lux, and of the speciﬁc forms residing in the possible
intellect as lumen.
To be sure, further work is required in order to substantiate this scheme, and to estab-
lish the linkage within a historical framework. Nevertheless, I believe that the similarity
presented here between Plotinus’s and the medieval split of light, along with their compa-
rable functioning as explicative solutions to the problem of unity in multiplicity, cannot be
overlooked.
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